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Abstract
We study how news coverage of immigrant criminality impacted municipality-level votes in the
November 2009 “minaret ban” referendum in Switzerland. The campaign, successfully led by the pop-
ulist Swiss People’s Party, played aggressively on fears of Muslim immigration and linked Islam with
terrorism and violence. We combine an exhaustive violent crime detection dataset with detailed informa-
tion on crime coverage from 12 newspapers. The data allow us to quantify the extent of pre-vote media
bias in the coverage of migrant criminality. We then estimate a theory-based voting equation in the
cross-section of municipalities. Exploiting random variations in crime occurrences, we find a first-order,
positive effect of news coverage on political support for the minaret ban. Counterfactual simulations
show that, under a law forbidding newspapers to disclose a perpetrator’s nationality, the vote in favor of
the ban would have decreased by 5 percentage points (from 57.6% to 52.6%).
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”When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you.
They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re
bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”
- Donald Trump, presidential announcement speech, June 16, 2015
1 Introduction
Right-wing populism is on the rise. Its success rests on a logic of fear and scapegoating. Austria,
Brazil, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, the Philippines, the UK, the US all form part of
a long list of countries where political parties campaign on platforms based on real or imaginary threats
to the interests of the common people. In fact, voters’ concerns on immigration, violence, and economic
insecurity are often key predictors of their support for populism (Figure 1). What is the role of media in
shaping constituencies’ perceptions of such threats and making these concerns salient? Beyond case studies
and anecdotes, this question remains overlooked from both a causal and quantitative perspective. The lack
of systematic evidence is worrying, as the media is supposed to exert powerful checks-and-balances in the
democratic process. In particular, a central element of populist rhetoric is the notion that communities with
growing immigrant populations are unsafe, and that immigration policy should be evaluated through this
lens. As voters are often not in a position to thoroughly assess the potential over-propensity of immigrants to
break the law, their beliefs are fueled by two possibly non-representative samples of crimes: that which they
observe in their local communities and that reported in the news. Media coverage of immigrant criminality,
and its potential bias, may thus significantly affect political outcomes and support for populism.
In this paper, we study empirically how news coverage of foreigner criminality impacted voting patterns
in the November 2009 referendum aimed at banning the construction of minarets on mosques in Switzer-
land. Initiated by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP/UDC), the referendum clearly stigmatized Islam, a religion
practiced by a recent community of migrants.1 The campaign was perceived as highly controversial since
it played aggressively on the fear of Muslim immigration and linked Islam with terrorism and violence.
Although Swiss police forces and consequently newspapers do not report religious affiliations, they do dis-
close perpetrators’ nationalities. Thus, voters were able to update their beliefs on the potential violence of
Muslims by reading news on foreigner criminality. The unexpected outcome, which drew attention from
around the world, was a clear vote in favor (57.6%) of banning minarets. Our analysis combines detailed
information on pre-vote crime coverage in 12 major Swiss newspapers with an exhaustive dataset of vio-
lent crime detection. We first quantify media bias in covering foreigner criminality, and then estimate a
theory-based voting equation in the cross-section of Swiss municipalities. Finally, we simulate our theoret-
ical model to quantify the political impact of various counterfactual policies regulating media coverage of
immigrant criminality.
1Over our period of interest, Muslims accounted for 5% of the total population (and roughly one quarter of the non-native
population). More than 98% are first-generation migrants.
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Figure 1: VOTER CONCERNS PREDICTING POPULIST VOTE
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Source: EU 2014 post-election survey (28 countries, 14,781 respondents). Notes: The figure displays the share of respondents who voted in
favor of a populist party by category of concerns and country. The survey question is: “What is the main concern which makes you vote in the
recent European elections?”. Of the 11 possible concerns that respondents could select, we pool “economic growth” and “unemployment” into the
category “economic insecurity,” and “crime” and “terrorism” into the category “violence.” “Immigration” stands alone, while the 6 other concerns
are pooled into “other.” For example, in France, populist votes are over-represented (34%) among respondents who declared that violence is their
main concern (contrasting with the 16% of populist votes among those who declared “other”). See Online Appendix Section ?? for details and
additional empirical evidence when controlling for individual characteristics. In the Online Appendix ??, we further assess the importance of
violence and immigration in the rhetoric of populist parties, and in the concerns expressed by their electorates.
The identification of a causal impact of media coverage on populist vote is challenging for at least three
reasons. First, in most democracies, representatives are elected on multi-dimensional political platforms,
which makes it difficult to link voting behavior and media reporting on specific issues. Second, reverse
causation is a concern, as xenophobic attitudes of the readership may very well drive both news coverage of
crimes perpetrated by immigrants and anti-foreigner vote. Third, the effect of reported migrant criminality
(i.e. as covered in the news) must be disentangled from the direct effect of criminality (i.e. its actual level).
Switzerland provides an ideal laboratory for tackling these methodological issues. The widespread use of
referendum – or so-called direct democracy – is a crucial feature of Swiss political institutions, making
possible the observation of political support on very specific issues at a fine grained-level (i.e. municipality
level). Moreover, Switzerland is highly heterogeneous from a cultural and linguistic perspective. We can
thus exploit spatial variations in voting, violence, and media exposure for the purpose of our identification
strategy. Finally, the availability of exhaustive crime detection data that includes information on nationalities
allows to compare raw facts and the news, as well as to estimate media bias in crime reporting and to
disentangle the impact of real versus reported criminality on voting. Note that we focus on the most violent
crimes only, such as murders, homicides, assassinations, and infanticides. These so-called signal crimes
are defined by Innes et al. (2002) as “particular types of criminal and disorderly conduct [that] have a
disproportionate impact upon fear of crime.” We show that such crimes are particularly newsworthy in
Switzerland. This characteristic, combined with the fact that newspapers are still widely read (see Appendix
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Figure ??), make signal crimes likely to impact beliefs, attitudes, and, consequently, voting behavior.
We first document a large upward distortion in media reporting of foreigner criminality over the pre-vote
period. Comparing foreign/native crime propensities between the detection data and the news, we find an
unconditional distortion that amounts to 243% during the three months preceding the vote. This pattern
is even more pronounced once we account for the standard determinants of news coverage, such as the
reader share of the journal in the district where the crime occurred. The pre-vote conditional likelihood
of appearing in the news is 5 times higher for foreign compared to native crime perpetrators. Yet this
differential likelihood vanishes after the vote, indicating that the Swiss People’s Party’s communication
strategy was very efficient in tilting public debate on the minaret ban towards questions of violence and
immigration. It also well illustrates the complex interplay between political communication and media
agenda-setting – a fascinating but overlooked question that is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.
The core of our analysis focuses on assessing the impact of media reporting of foreigner criminality on
the minaret ban vote. We begin by building a simple model of crime news and probabilistic voting with
the aim of structurally grounding our empirical specifications and counterfactual simulations. The theory
highlights how readers can estimate the (over-)propensity of Muslims to commit crimes from a sample
of news that mentions perpetrators’ nationality but not their religion. Their inference procedure is funda-
mentally based on the comparison of crime news across nationalities that have different compositions of
Muslims. However, with crimes being infrequent and news coverage sparse, nationality-based inference is
not precise given the modest size of foreign diasporas in Switzerland. We show that statistical accuracy in-
creases dramatically and satisfies conventional levels of significance when readers pool all the news related
to foreign nationalities together and compare the latter to news on natives. Pooling is also cognitively par-
simonious from the reader’s perspective as it drastically reduces the information set that she has to process.
Our main theoretical prediction is thus that the municipality-level share of votes in favor of the minaret ban
is positively impacted by Crime News Exposure (CNE), a variable averaging the reported crime propensity
differential between foreigners and natives across newspapers (weighted by market shares). We also derive
additional predictions related to the informational processing of news by voters (e.g. selective recall and
de-biasing).
Our theory-based voting equation is then empirically tested. The main concern relates to the presence
of omitted variables, such as latent xenophobia, which could co-determine CNE and voting patterns. For
the sake of causality, we thus exploit pre-vote random variations in the occurrence of detected crimes in
the respective neighborhoods of newspapers’ headquarters (HQs). In fact, our first-stage estimates show
that, besides nationality and reader share, a key driver of news coverage is the spatial proximity between
the area where a crime is perpetrated and the location where a newspaper is edited. More specifically,
we instrument CNE with the cross-HQs weighted average of detected crime propensity differential between
foreigners and natives. Importantly for the identifying variations, we look at newspapers from different
regions of Switzerland such that the locations of their respective HQs are found in different places. The
OLS and 2SLS estimates show that CNE has a positive and statistically significant impact on the vote in
favor of the minaret ban at the municipality-level. We also find that readers do not manage to "debias" news
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and actually overreact to foreign crime news. Our preferred specification includes fine-grained spatial fixed-
effects and a large array of municipality characteristics, including anti-foreign past vote outcomes (a proxy
for xenophobia). Our findings are robust to various sensitivity checks such as, for example, the potential
presence of stereotyping, alternative options for the pooling of news, the instrumental variables, and the
coding of newspaper articles. We also implement a set of falsification exercises that assess the validity of
the exclusion restriction. Finally, counterfactual simulations show that, under a law forbidding newspapers
to disclose a perpetrator’s nationality, the vote in favor of the ban would have decreased by 5 percentage
points (from 57.6% to 52.6%).
The Swiss Minaret Referendum We briefly discuss now the main contextual elements related to the
referendum; additional details are provided in the Online Appendix ??. The minaret ban referendum was
initiated by a group primarily composed of politicians of the far-right Swiss People’s Party (SVP/UDC).2
In July 2008, this group collected the mandatory 100,000 signatures required to launch a popular initiative
to ban the construction of minarets in Switzerland.3 The proposition of this referendum was to introduce
a single sentence in the constitution: “The construction of minarets is prohibited” (Art. 72. P. 3). The
government, both chambers, and all majority parties except the Swiss People’s Party opposed the initiative.4
The proposition was perceived as a threat to peaceful religious co-existence in Switzerland, and potentially
harmful to Switzerland’s international image.5
In reality, the minaret ban was barely policy relevant as in 2009 there were only 4 minarets in Switzer-
land, none of which performed a prayer call.6 They were, however, depicted as a symbol of the expansion
of Islam in the country. The initiators of the referendum built on the idea that while in 1980 there were just
56,600 Muslims in the country, they would soon reach half a million, mostly recently arrived foreigners of
non-European origin.7 The campaign leading up to the referendum was highly controversial, capitalizing on
2The so-called “Egerkinger” committee. Of this committee, 14 out of the 16 participants were members the Swiss People’s
Party while the remaining 2 were members of the Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland (EDU/UDF).
3In Switzerland, citizens can launch a federal popular initiative by collecting 100,000 valid signatures of Swiss nationals. These
signatures must be collected within 18 months of the official start of a signature collection campaign. Once the 100,000 signature
threshold is reached, the signatures are brought to the Federal Chancellery for validation. The popular initiative then becomes an
object on which Swiss citizens vote during a “votation.” Votations take place 3 to 4 times per year. From 2001 to 2010, 31 votations
took place during which Swiss citizens were asked to vote on 94 objects (popular initiatives and referenda). For simplicity, we
hereon refer to the popular initiative as a referendum.
4The Swiss Parliament votes in support or disapproval of popular initiatives before citizens are consulted. In this case, 171
members of Parliament voted against the minaret ban, 13 abstained, and 54 voted in favor.
5The Swiss Constitution guarantees equality in front of the law and prohibits discrimination (Art. 8). Furthermore, all popular
initiatives violating the jus cogens of international law (i.e. the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the United
Nation’s Pact II) must be declared invalid (Art. 139). The “minaret ban” would not, however, be considered contrary to the Swiss
constitution as popular initiatives are constitutional amendments. Moreover, despite potentially breaching Articles 9 and 14 of the
ECHR, and Articles 2 and 18 of the UN Pact II, it was decided that the ban does not violate the intangible rights guaranteed by the
ECHR and the UN Pact II.
6The minarets are located respectively in Geneva, Zurich, Winterthur and Wangen bei Olten. The building of a fifth minaret
was authorized in Langenthal in July 2009, but was never constructed.
7In the year 2000 in Switzerland (the time of the last population census collecting information on religious affiliations), there
were 310,807 inhabitants of Muslim faith (representing 4.3% of the total population), 88.7% of whom did not have Swiss citizen-
ship. Of these inhabitants, 87% were from Turkey and the Balkans (Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia) and 6.3% were Arabic-speaking.
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fears of Muslim immigration and linking Islam with terrorism and violence. Islam was presented as a threat
to fundamental Swiss values and to this end the main campaign poster depicted minarets as missiles com-
ing out of the Swiss flag (Figure ??). The number of Google searches of the words "violence," "murder,"
"attack," and "killer" rose dramatically in the three months preceding the vote, an indication of the growing
anxiety of the population towards violence and crime (Figure ??).
The referendum took place on November 29, 2009. Pre-referendum polls had indicated a comfortable, if
slowly shrinking, majority against the proposal.8 The participation rate (53.9%) turned out to be the largest
in the past five years. The unexpected win of the “yes” campaign with 57.5% of the ballots came as a
shock not only in Switzerland, but around the world. The New York Times described the outcome as one that
“displayed a widespread anxiety” (NYT, Nov 30, 2009). The Guardian spoke of the result as "likely to cause
strife [...] and set back efforts to integrate a population of some 400,000 Muslims, most of whom [were]
European Muslims – and non-mosque-goers – from the Balkans" (The Guardian, Nov 29, 2009). Approval
of the ban was initially perceived as a response to increased fears of Islam and yet the voting patterns reveal
that there was a strong anti-foreigner component. For instance, the correlation between the minaret ban
outcome and immigration referenda during the 2000-2009 period is positive and significant, ranging from
0.7 to 0.8 (see Figure A.1 in Appendix).
Literature Review This paper contributes to the economic literature on the drivers of populism. The
seminal paper of Acemoglu et al. (2013) emphasizes the key role of inequality and weak institutions in
explaining left-wing populist votes, at a time when Latin America was experiencing a wave of populist
success. With the rise instead of right-wing populism in the U.S. and many European countries, economists
have explored why populist campaigns may also succeed in advanced economies (for simplicity, we hereon
refer to this phenomenon as “populism”). A feature that is present in all such populist rhetorics is the premise
that minorities, and notably immigrants, put the interests of the common people at risk (Guiso et al., 2017a;
Rodrik, 2017). Scholars have consequently mostly studied the role of economic insecurity as a driver of
populist vote. This form of insecurity spread after the financial crisis and encompasses unemployment
threats, import competition, and negative income shocks combined with an increased labor market exposure
to globalization. To this regard, Algan et al. (2017) link the rise in unemployment in Europe caused by the
Great Recession to the decline of trust in institutions. Dal Bo et al. (2018) and Guiso et al. (2017a) show
how the demand and supply for populist politics is fueled by the threat of economic insecurity. Local labor
market exposure to imports from low-wage countries has been found to explain both the success of the Leave
option in the Brexit vote (Colantone and Stanig, 2016) and support for nationalist parties in recent elections
in Germany (Dippel et al., 2017), as well as the increased polarization of U.S. politics (Autor et al., 2016).
The consequences for institution building, and notably currency unions, have been explored by Alesina et
al. (2017) and Guiso et al. (2017b). In this paper, we build on this literature by showing that, in addition to
In 2014, Muslim inhabitants represented an estimated 5.1% of the total population, 34.2% of whom were Swiss nationals (94%
issued from migration) while 58.6% where first generation immigrants.
8In the last survey before the referendum on Nov 11, 2009, only 37% of respondents declared being in favor of the initiative.
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economic insecurity, electoral strategies based on stigmatization and scapegoating form a fundamental part
of recent waves of populism. In particular, we are able to quantitatively assess the first-order role played by
the mass media in this success.
Our paper also adds to a flourishing literature on the economic determinants of media bias and its politi-
cal consequences.9 While the ideological bias of news outlets has been extensively documented (Groseclose
and Milyo, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010), we explore the filtering of information related to violent
crimes, i.e. the fact that a given crime may or may not be reported by a newspaper. Similarly to Snyder
and Strömberg (2010) who study media coverage of electoral politics, we find evidence of demand-driven
news provision as crimes occurring in high readershare areas tend to be more reported. Moreover, we
also document supply-side shifters by showing that geographical proximity between crimes and journal-
ists/newsrooms significantly increases the probability of coverage. The baseline analysis studies how media
sampling of immigrant criminality affects support for populism. Our results on the quantitatively large im-
pact of crime news on vote thus speaks to the literature that links media coverage of electoral politics and
voter behavior.10 To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first empirical evidence of the significant
role played by media in the success of a populist campaign.
Finally, our findings inform the recent literature on the relation between immigration and anti-foreigner
votes and attitudes (Barone et al., 2016; Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Halla et al., 2017; Mayda et al., 2016;
Moriconi et al., 2018; Otto and Steinhardt, 2014). We also add to studies on immigration and crime (Bianchi
et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2013; Couttenier et al., 2016) by looking at their impact on electoral outcomes. In
this respect, our approach relates to the work of Drago et al. (2016), which views criminality as a driver of
electoral outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and then Section 3 provides a model of
media coverage of criminality and populist voting. In Section 4 we analyze the empirical determinants of
the media coverage of violent crimes before turning to the estimation of the effect of crime news on populist
vote in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Data Description
In this section we provide information on the main data sources and variables used throughout the
paper. We are primarily interested in collecting data on municipality-level votes, pre-vote criminality, and
news coverage for 2009. With the dual objective of comparing pre- and post-vote patterns and of conducting
falsification exercises, we also collect information on post-vote news coverage (in 2010). As far as crime
data is concerned, we use a longer time period as our instrumental variable strategy is based on short-run
deviations of criminality with respect to its medium-run trend over the 2009-2013 period.
9See Gentzkow et al. (2016); Puglisi and Snyder (2015) for a survey of, respectively, the theoretical and empirical aspects of
media bias in the literature.
10See Strömberg (2004); Gentzkow (2006); Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2009); Snyder and Strömberg (2010); Gentzkow et
al. (2011); Drago et al. (2014); DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007); Gerber et al. (2009); Snyder and Strömberg (2010); Enikolopov et
al. (2011); Gentzkow et al. (2011); Durante et al. (2015).
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Criminality – Data on criminality comes from the Swiss Statistical Office. This exhaustive non-publicly
available dataset contains information on all crimes detected by the police in Switzerland between 2009 and
2013. The data were collected by local police services and cover every case where an individual was charged
with an infraction(s) to the (federal) Penal Code. Remarkably, this information includes the nationality and
residency status of victims and perpetrators of any detected infraction, as well as the place, date, and nature
of the crime. We focus on the most violent (and newsworthy) infractions (i.e. murders, assassinations,
and infanticides), which leaves us with a sample of 973 murders, 48 assassinations, and 5 infanticides,
perpetrated by 1,200 individuals over the 2009-2013 period.11 With an average frequency of 14 cases and
20 perpetrators per month, such crimes are thus relatively infrequent in Switzerland – a feature that is likely
to contribute to their newsworthiness.
Newspaper coverage of violent crime – The sample of crime-related news is constructed using articles
published in 2009 and 2010 in 12 major Swiss newspapers (6 German- and 6 French-speaking papers),
which represent a total share of 60.4% of the market.12 We choose a standard set of keywords to identify
the articles, such as kill and murder, as well as their variants. We restrict the search window from 2 days
prior to the violent crime up to 10 days afterwards. This procedure results in a sample of 4,022 articles.
Following this data scrapping procedure, each article is read and cross-checked twice to ensure that our
algorithm correctly assigns every article to its relevant crime (with the aim of limiting type I errors). This
allows us to match 450 articles corresponding to 138 perpetrators out of the 507 perpetrators recorded in the
crime data over the 2009-2010 period (see Online Appendix Section ?? for more details).
Religion and nationality – In Switzerland, neither the police forces nor newspapers disclose information
on perpetrators’ religion.13 Over the 2009-2010 period none of the 450 articles in our sample mentioned any
religious affiliation. Hence, readers must rely on indirect information, such as nationality or immigration
status, to assess the relative criminality of different religious groups. Nationality is instead well-documented
both in the crime data (75.6% of the cases) and the news articles (43% of our sample) (Figure ?? shows how
nationality is typically reported in a newspaper article). Based on our theoretical model, we consequently
build measures of both detected and reported criminality (i.e. respectively from the crime data and the
articles) that contrast foreigner and native crime propensities. We also exploit information provided by the
Swiss Statistical Office in order to link nationalities and religious background (see Section 5.3). Finally, it
is important to note that nationalities are not reported in 57% of the articles. While we exclude these from
11More details about the selection of crimes included in our sample are discussed in Online Appendix Section ??.
12The German-speaking outlets include (with average market share in brackets): 20 Minuten D-CH (13.6%), SonntagsZeitung
(9%), Tages-Anzeiger (6.1%), NZZ am Sonntag (5.4%), Neue Zuercher Zeitung (3.6%), and St. Galler Tagblatt (1.9%). The
French-speaking outlets include: Le Matin dimanche (6.5%), 20 Minutes F-CH (4.4%), Le Matin (lu-sa) (3.7%), 24Heures (2.9%),
Tribune de Geneve (1.9%), and Le Temps (1.5%). This newspaper sample covers 8 out the 10 largest Swiss newspapers; the
smallest for which we have data ranks 17th. The largest newspaper for which we do not have data is Blick (8.2% of market, ranked
3rd in country). The Blick archives are not available on Lexis/Nexis and the search engine on the Blick site does not allow to restrict
to the time frame used, making it impossible to follow the same data collection process used with the other newspapers.
13Recording of the perpetrator’s religion by the police at the time of the infraction is not compulsory.
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the baseline sample as they provide poor and ambiguous information to readers on foreigner criminality,
we explore more inclusive coding choices in our sensitivity analysis (Section 5.4 and Online Appendix
Section ??).
Other data – Data on voting outcomes, demography, and municipality characteristics are collected by
the Swiss Statistical Office. The municipality-level voting data provide information on the number of voters
registered, total ballots, valid ballots, and votes in favor for every referendum since 1960. Population data in-
form on the native/foreign composition, language, religion, sectoral employment, gender-age distributions,
and education. We also add time-invariant municipality characteristics such as elevation and ruggedness
(standard deviation of elevation). Newspaper circulation data come from the Research and Studies in Adver-
tising Media Association (WEMF/REMP).14, which conducts two surveys per year, covering approximately
20,000 individuals and collecting information on media consumption. Based on the waves from 2006 to
2008, information on the district of residence of the respondents allows to calculate pre-vote market share
for each newspaper in every district.
3 Theoretical Framework
With the aim of structuring our empirical analysis, we start by providing a model of media coverage of
criminality and populist voting. The setup is kept simple and builds on the existing theoretical literature on
media coverage and political accountability (Strömberg, 2015), with the main departure being our emphasis
on how voters extract information about criminality from the news. Given the infrequency of the crimes
under observation and the sparseness of the related news, it is particularly important to assess whether the
voters’ inference procedure is accurate enough to make an informed voting decision. In this respect, we
show that statistical accuracy is greatly improved when voters pool all news related to foreigners together
and compare them to news on natives. Note that the way we model voters’ inference procedure depends
on our set of behavioral and informational assumptions; the sensitivity of our baseline results to alternative
assumptions is investigated both theoretically and empirically.
Vote and criminality – Starting from a one-period probabilistic voting model (Lindbeck and Weibull,
1987) we assume that a rational voter k living in municipality m endorses the minaret ban if
Ek
[
UYESk −UNOk
]
+ xenok ≥ 0 (1)
The first term captures the expected difference in utility between the two aggregate outcomes of the vote
(adoption or rejection of the ban) where the expectation depends on the information set of k. The second
term is an individual taste shock, unobserved by the econometrician, that is uniformly distributed with a
14We kindly thank Marc Sele for granting access to the WEMF/REMP dataset.
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municipality specific mean xenom and, w.l.o.g., a variance normalized to 1/12. Hence municipalities with
higher xenom tend to be more supportive of the minaret ban everything else equal.
Crucially, we make the assumption of crime priming, namely that voters consider criminality a first-
order issue when evaluating the costs and benefits of the minaret ban. Indeed, inducing crime priming among
voters was a key aspect of the communication strategy of the populist party that initiated the referendum.
Understanding the strategic determinants of priming is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Here we
take priming as given and simply posit that a voter’s utility depends negatively on her own assessment of
the post-referendum average crime rate. In her view, the referendum outcome is likely to reduce criminality
when she believes that Muslims are more violent than non-Muslims. By making Switzerland less Islam-
friendly, the minaret ban will ultimately change the religious composition of the pool of migrants.
More precisely, we assume a linear utility Uk = −#crimeAll/popAll where the crime rate is defined as
the ratio of the total amount of crimes over adult population.15 We also assume that 0 ≤ ωYES < ωNO ≤ 1
where ω denotes the outcome-dependent share of Muslims in the total population after the referendum.
Based on her reading of the news, the voter holds a belief that the unconditional crime propensity of Muslims
κM differs (i.e. is larger) from the unconditional crime propensity of non-Muslims κNM. Several rationales
can sustain this belief, from the opinion that Islam may lead to a culture of violence and fanaticism, to the
view that religious affiliation is not the problem per se but that migrants from Muslim countries are selected
along crime-prone characteristics (e.g. young males with a war background). Note that the voting decision is
influenced by the unconditional crime propensity because what ultimately matters to the voter is the fact that
the Muslim migration inflow is associated with violence, whatever the underlying channels (individual or
population-level drivers). These elements lead to the following characterization of the outcome-dependent
criminality #crimeAll/popAll = (ω · κM + (1−ω) · κNM). Simple computations yield the expected utility
differential:
Ek
[
UYESk −UNOk
]
= (ωNO −ωYES)×Ek
[
κM − κNM
]
(2)
A key feature of the previous equation is that voter k makes an imprecise assessment of the (unobserved)
crime differential between Muslims/non-Muslims. That is, her expectation of the differential (κM − κNM) is
based on the sub-sample of crimes covered by newspapers.16 Assuming that voter k reads one and only
one newspaper j ∈ {1, ..., J}, we set Ek [κM − κNM] = κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj where κ̂j stands for the estimator of crime
propensities based on the news reported in newspaper j. Combining Equations (1) and (2) we observe that
15In the paper we define “crime propensity” as the individual-level probability of perpetrating a crime, while here the “crime
rate” measures the average probability for an individual to be victimized.
16For the sake of exposition our model ignores other sources of information. In our empirical analysis we nevertheless control
for the intensity of local violence at the municipality-level with the idea that direct observation and communication within social
networks convey information on the crime differential.
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voter k supports the minaret ban with a probability equal to
PYESk = P
[
xenok ≥ −(UYESk −UNOk )
]
=
1
2
+ xenom + (ω
NO −ωYES)× (κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj ) (3)
Aggregating at the municipality level across individuals and newspapers yields the share of voters supporting
the minaret ban in municipality m
YESm =
1
2
+ xenom + (ω
NO −ωYES)×∑
j
sm(j) · (κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj ) (4)
where sm(j) is the market share of newspaper j in municipality m.17
Interpreting news – We now discuss how a rational voter infers the crime differential (κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj ) from
reading newspaper j. In Switzerland, as explained above, police forces and newspapers do not communicate
religious affiliations, but do report nationalities. Hence, the inference procedure is fundamentally based
on the comparison of news coverage across nationalities that have different religious compositions (i.e.
Muslim and non-Muslim). We consequently model how readers map nationalities to religion. To this
regard, stereotyping plays a crucial role, as discussed in Section 5.3. For the moment, let us denote µn the
perception of the representative Swiss reader of the share of Muslims among nationals from country n living
in Switzerland – with the possibility for this figure to be distorted with respect to the real share. Although the
nationality/religion mapping is not observed by the econometrician, this limitation has no consequences for
our empirical analysis since ultimately, as we show below, our econometric specification does not depend
on the exact form of this mapping. Finally, mapping could differ from one reader to another. However,
cross-reader variations cancel out when aggregating at the readership level; we can thus save on notation by
ignoring them.
The inference problem of the representative reader of newspaper j consists of estimating the parameters
(κM, κNM) based on her observation of #newsnj, the amount of news reported by j for each nationality n.
The voter correctly figures out the data generating process of news as the outcome of two nested binomial
processes: (Step 1) within the sample of Muslims and non-Muslims of nationality n, of total size popn, each
individual perpetrates a crime with a religion-dependent probability κ; (Step 2) each crime is reported by
newspaper j with a nationality-specific probability Pnj. Consequently the Data Generating Process (DGP)
of news is given by
#newsnj = Pnj ×
[
µn · popn · κM + (1− µn) · popn · κNM
]
+ νnj (5)
17We use market shares (i.e. sales of newspaper j in total sales) in our aggregating procedure as information is available for all
municipalities. By contrast, newspaper readership (i.e. share of readers of j in total population) is known only for a sub-sample of
municipalities. Figure ?? shows, however, that for this sub-sample the propensity to read newspapers is homogeneous and close to
100% in most municipalities. Hence the two measures are, in fact, comparable.
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where νnj is a random noise that captures sampling variations in crime perpetration or news reporting.
Sampling variations tend to be large because crimes are rare events. This noise leads to a large dispersion in
the distribution of #newsnj, making inference based on nationality-level information challenging. To gauge
how noisy the news process is, we can compute the coefficient of variation of news cvnews (i.e. relative
standard deviation).18 Applying the central limit theorem to the nested binomial process (5) yields
cvnews ≈
1√
Pnj · κn · popn
(6)
where κn ≡ µn · κM + (1− µn) · κNM corresponds to the average crime propensity (which is empirically
small). Equation (6) shows how sample size (popn) restores some informativeness when crimes are infre-
quent (κn is low) and/or news coverage is sparse (Pnj is low). Let us compute the minimum sample size
required to have a low-variance news process – for example, such that cvnews < 1/1.96 ≈ 50%. This
criterion means that 95% of the distribution of news lies below twice its mean, translating into the following
size requirement:
popn &
1.962
Pnj · κ̂n
(7)
In the data, the crime propensity attached to the restricted set of extremely violent crimes examined
here is very low: we observe 237 crime perpetrators for a total population size of 7.7 million in 2009.
Moreover, the average reporting probability is around 0.38. Mapping these figures in relationship (7) we see
that the sample size requirement is around 330,000 individuals. Aside from natives (6 million individuals),
not a single nationality reaches this level. With a total of 288,000 individuals (0.3% being Muslim), the
Italian diaspora represented the largest immigrant community in Switzerland in 2009; Serbia was ranked
4th (115,000 individuals; 40% Muslim) and Turkey 6th (71,000 individuals, 96% Muslim). In sum, the
small population size of the foreign diaspora and the low crime frequency lead to a noisy news DGP for all
nationalities but the natives.
Rearranging terms in Equation (5) leads to the equation that is at the heart of the inference problem of
the reader
#newsnj/Pnj
popn
= κNM +
[
κM − κNM
]
× µn + ξnj (8)
where ξnj ≡
νnj/Pnj
popn
. Equation (8) suggests a method for inferring the crime differential. Under the assump-
tion that the components of the LHS are observed/known, the reader can run a cross-nationality regression
of #newsnj/Pnj
popn
on the share of Muslim µn. The OLS coefficient of µn then provides an estimate of the crime
differential. Although its simplicity makes it attractive, this method relies on an informational assumption
18 Formally, the sample is composed of popn individuals i. We can define at the individual-level a binary variable newsij that is
equal to 1 if i perpetrates a crime that is reported in the newspaper j and zero otherwise. Hence, zero codes for two types of events:
no crime or unreported crime. The binomial process newsij is ruled by the compounded probability τ ≡ Pnj × κn. Assuming iid
draws across individuals, the central limits theorem implies that ∑i newsijpopn =
#newsnj
popn
∼ N
(
τ, τ(1−τ)popn
)
.
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that seems very unrealistic: the reader must know µn and popn for all nationalities of migrants. Moreover,
the sampling variations discussed above severely impair the precision of the estimates. These two reasons
limit our interest to statistical inference based on nationality-level information. We nevertheless implement
this as a sensitivity test in our empirical analysis (Section 5.3).
Our baseline analysis focuses on an inference procedure that is both more accurate and less cognitively
demanding from the reader’s perspective. Indeed, with two free parameters on the RHS, Equation (8) makes
clear that inference can be based on the comparison of news between just two different populations. Hence,
all foreign nationalities can be pooled together in one unique sample (denoted by F), that is then compared to
the sample of natives (CH). This comparison is natural as we expect Swiss readers to take their co-nationals
as a reference point. Moreover, Islam in Switzerland is foremost associated with foreigners since more
than 95% of Muslims are first-generation migrants. Pooling nationalities expands the sample size such that
criterion (7) is satisfied not only for natives but also for foreigners, with the additional cognitive benefit of
the reader having to handle a smaller information set. Note that the robustness of our empirical results to
alternative pooling schemes is successfully tested in Section 5.3.
By aggregating news across all foreign nationalities, the reader deals with an equation that only differs
from Equation (8) in that the index n is replaced by F (i.e. µF measures the share of Muslims among
migrants). Then, considering first-differences between F and CH and noticing that E
(
ξFj
)
= E
(
ξCHj
)
= 0
the reader of newspaper j gets the following estimator of the Muslim/non-Muslim crime differential:
κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj =
1
µF − µCH
×
(
#newsFj/PFj
popF
−
#newsCHj/PCHj
popCH
)
(9)
where the average share of Muslims among natives (µCH = 0.7%) is much smaller than the share of Muslims
among foreigners (µF = 17.4%).
Two well-known informational problems are likely to affect the previous estimator when the reader
makes her voting decision. Firstly, reporting probabilities are unobserved and the unsophisticated reader
misrepresents the extent of media bias (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007). Secondly, there is an imperfect
and selective recall of the stock of past news (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010; Benabou, 2015; Bordalo et
al., 2016), meaning that the reader differentially remembers news related to foreigner/native crimes. In
our context, various factors can contribute to this phenomenon including the confirmation of pre-existing
stereotypes, the framing of crime news by journalists, and increased coverage of crimes before the votation.
With the aim of documenting these empirically, we model sources of misinference in a parsimonious way.
Let us denote with (PFj, PCHj) the reporting probabilities as perceived by the reader and (RFj, RCHj) the recall
frequencies (i.e. probability that a given past news content comes to the reader’s mind). Equation (9) then
becomes
κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj =
1
µF − µCH
× 1
PCHj/RCHj
×
(
Sj ·
#newsFj
popF
−
#newsCHj
popCH
)
(10)
where the weighting factor Sj ≡
RFj/RCHj
PFj/PCHj
can be interpreted as the relative salience of foreign news in
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the estimation procedure. This non-negative factor increases with selective recall of foreign crime news
(numerator) and decreases with the reader’s perception of a reporting bias in the coverage of foreigner news
(denominator). In our empirical analysis we document which of those two effects dominates (i.e. whether
Sj is above or below 1). Everything else equal, a naive reader who ignores the existence of media bias tends
to perceive a crime differential that is above its real value. In contrast, a sophisticated reader corrects for
this bias by putting more weight on the native crime news and infers a smaller crime differential.
Finally, the reader is also able to gauge the precision of her inference by testing the null hypothesis
κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj = 0. We implement this test of news precision in the empirical Section 5.2. We show that,
in the data, newspapers constitute a precise (but biased) source of information about the crime propensity
differential between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Testable predictions – Combining Equations (4) and (10) we obtain the structural relationship that will
be estimated in our empirical analysis
YESm =
1
2
+ xenom +
ωNO −ωYES
µF − µCH
×∑
j
sm(j)
PCHj/RCHj
×
(
Sj ·
#newsFj
popF
−
#newsCHj
popCH
)
(11)
This equation can be interpreted in light of the basic elements of populist rhetorics. First, populist vote
increases with the view that there is a threat of over-migration that must be actively blocked: this channel
corresponds to the term (ωNO − ωYES). Secondly, stigmatization matters as support for populism increases
with the amount of news covering foreigner criminality (the term #newsFj). However the theory allows for
several layers of sophistication in voters’ decision-making: (i) voters look at crime differentials, not absolute
levels, as they benchmark foreigner against native crime news (the term −#newsCHj); (ii) voters take into
account representativeness by accounting for population sizes; (iii) voters weight foreign news more when
the selective recall effect is strong and when media bias is disregarded (the term Sj). Finally, the previous
equation informs on the heterogeneous effects across newspapers. The term 1
PCHj/RCHj
implies that crime news
have a higher marginal impact on votes when newspaper j tends to cover crimes either in a sparse way, or
in a sensational way that facilitates future recall. Hence we expect some ambiguity when comparing the
elasticity of voting to crime news between readerships of tabloids and regular newspapers. On the one hand,
crime news is usually framed in a memorable way in tabloids and this feature increases their impact on
future votes. On the other hand, regular newspapers rarely cover crimes such that, for the inference of the
crime differential, the informational value of any news published in such sources is high (and so is their
impact on future vote).
While the theoretical relationship (11) features all these elements, we implement various strategies in
our econometric analysis in order to gauge their respective empirical relevance. As a preliminary step, in
Section 4, we investigate empirically the determinants of news provision in this equation. Section 5 discusses
the estimation procedure of Equation (11) and displays the main results. In our baseline specification the
salience parameter Sj is constrained to 1 when estimating Equation (11), but we also consider several flexible
versions. Among the main ones, we estimate a specification where the Foreign/Native news components are
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separated and have their own regression coefficient, enabling to elicit salience. This result speaks to the
discussion in the media literature on the extent to which agents manage to "debias" news. Determining
the quantitative magnitude of this phenomenon matters for assessing the consequences of media bias on
political behavior.
4 Crime News Provision
This section studies the main determinants of crime news provision. We particularly look at whether
newspapers over-report crimes perpetrated by foreigners. Beside its intrinsic interest, this analysis grounds
the first stage of our instrumental variable strategy and is crucial for the quantification of counterfactual
policy experiments (Section 5).
4.1 Unconditional Evidence
Crimes newsworthiness – In 2009 and 2010, 507 perpetrators of violent crimes were detected by the
police forces. Of these, 138 were mentioned in the news. Some newspapers covered crimes extensively,
such as 20 Minuten DE-CH, which reported on 34 different perpetrators, or 20 Minutes F-CH where 19
different perpetrators were mentioned. These two newspapers are usually classified as tabloids.19 At the
other end of the spectrum, Le Temps, a nationwide French-speaking general-audience daily newspaper,
covered only 3 perpetrators.
Media bias – In Appendix Table A.1 we document distortion in the media coverage of foreigner crimi-
nality. Over the 2009-2010 period, out of the 235 foreign perpetrators, 85 were mentioned in at least one
newspaper in our sample; out of the 272 Swiss perpetrators, 53 were mentioned.20 Disaggregated at the
newspaper-level, these figures translate into an unconditional coverage probability of foreign/native crimi-
nals that is, on average, equal to PFj = 0.031 and PCHj = 0.017 respectively. We now define the reporting
bias of newspaper j as Bj ≡ (PFj −PCHj)/PCHj. Applying this formula, we get that the unconditional re-
porting bias of foreign criminals is on average equal to 82% across newspapers. We also observe substantial
heterogeneity: while 20 Minutes F-CH and 24Heures have a reporting bias of 334% and 154% respectively,
Le Temps and Neue Zurcher Zeitung have almost no reporting bias (16% each).
Pre- and post-vote patterns – We examine the time evolution of media coverage in greater detail in
Appendix Table A.2. First, the pre-vote coverage probability of foreign criminals is on average larger
than its post-vote counterpart (PFj = 0.045 and PFj = 0.020, respectively), with a dramatic increase 3
months before the vote (PFj = 0.079). Similarly, the reporting bias reaches 248% just before the vote,
and then afterwards drops to 160%. This evolution could potentially mirror a change in detection policy,
19See our discussion of newspaper classification at the end of section 5.2.
20In the detection data, the crime propensity is equal to 6.9 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants for foreigners residing in Switzerland,
and 2.2 per 100,000 inhabitants for Swiss nationals. Explaining the sources of this discrepancy is beyond the scope of this paper.
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with police forces prompted to target foreigners before the vote. The crime data do not, however, support
this hypothesis. With 212 perpetrators (a monthly average of 19.27), 47% of whom being foreigners, pre-
vote characteristics of detected crimes are comparable to their post-vote counterparts. More comprehensive
balancing tests are implemented in Appendix Table A.3. The absence of statistically significant effects
suggests that endogenous detection is unlikely to be a concern in our data.
4.2 Determinants of News Coverage
We now assess the main determinants of the probability that a given perpetrator i is mentioned in news-
paper j. This is made possible by the exhaustive information on both the raw facts (i.e. the detected crimes)
and their news coverage. The following Linear Probability Model (LPM) is estimated on the full sample of
507 perpetrators × 12 newspapers over the 2009-2010 period21
P(newsij = 1) = ρ · foreigni + α · readershareij + β · newspaperHQij + X′iγ + X′jλ (12)
where the outcome variable newsij takes the value of 1 when perpetrator i is reported in newspaper j (and
her nationality is mentioned), and 0 otherwise. Crime news without a nationality are coded as zero. This
coding choice stems from our theoretical analysis where only news mentioning nationalities are informative
for the reader, other crime news being discarded (Equation 10).
In the previous LPM, our main variable of interest is foreigni, a dummy equal to 1 when perpetrator
i is a foreigner (0 otherwise). Its coefficient (ρ) captures whether newspapers cover foreign perpetrators
more than natives, conditioning on the standard determinants of news coverage. We control for the reader
share of newspaper j in the municipality where the crime perpetrated by i has occurred, readershareij,
since newspaper j is more likely to provide information on events occurring in areas where a large share
of its readership is located (Snyder and Strömberg, 2010). Arguably, controlling for the readership effect,
some areas may still be more extensively covered than others, notably for cost-related reasons. In fact, one
could argue that the cost of journalist investigations is likely to decrease with geographical proximity. We
control for the potential effect of the geographical proximity to newspaper headquarters (HQs) by including
newspaperHQij, a binary variable that takes the value 1 if newspaper j has a headquarter in the area where
the crime of perpetrator i was perpetrated.22 Note that we are also interested in its coefficient β, since our
instrumental variable strategy in Section 5 relies on the geographical proximity between crimes and HQs.
The richness of our dataset enables us to control for a large array of covariates and fixed effects (Xi and
Xj). First, we include a set of fixed effects related to the nature, timing and location of the crime: i) calendar
21Including a large array of fixed effects leads us to estimate a LPM in order to alleviate any concern over perfect predictors. For
non-linear estimates, see Online Appendix Section ??. Note also that the Lexis/Nexis data for St. Galler Tagblatt is only available
in 2010.
22What we call HQs throughout this paper are essentially editorial rooms. Some newspapers have headquarters in more than
one municipality. Le Temps, for example, has headquarters in Lausanne, Geneva, Zurich, Bern, and Neuchâtel. The editing of
newspapers in our sample takes place primarily in large cities: Zurich (6 newspapers), Lausanne (5), Bern (3), Geneva (3), St.
Gallen (2), Basel (1), Luzern (1), and Neuchâtel (1).
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Table 1: CRIME NEWS PROVISION
Dependent Variable News coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign perpetrator 0.022a 0.022a 0.022a 0.022a
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Readershare 0.240a 0.073
(0.067) (0.094)
Newspaper HQ area 0.049a 0.039b
(0.012) (0.018)
Observations 5847 5847 5847 5847
R2 0.237 0.242 0.243 0.243
Sample mean (News coverage) 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024
Notes: The unit of observation is a perpatetrator × newspaper dyad. Standard errors clustered at crime event level in parentheses. c significant at
10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. Linear probability model estimations. Individual characteristics of the perpetrator are included: age,
age squared, gender, connection to the victim, and whether the perpetrator is a recidivist. Calendar day, year-week, crime subcategory, municipality,
and newspaper fixed effects are included.
day and year-week fixed effects to control for seasonality of crimes; ii) crime subcategory fixed effects to
control for potential differences in newsworthiness across different types of crimes;23 iii) municipality fixed
effects to account for potential asymmetric coverage across municipalities (e.g. potential higher coverage in
large urban centers). Second, we add perpetrator characteristics such as age, age squared, gender, connec-
tion to the victim, and an indicator for recidivism. Third, we include newspaper fixed effects that capture
time-invariant newspaper-specific characteristics, such as political orientation and readership composition.
Finally, standard errors are clustered at the level of the crime.
Baseline results – Table 1 displays the results. The main coefficient of interest is positive and statistically
significant (column 1). In terms of magnitude, the coverage probability of crimes perpetrated by foreigners
is 92% larger than the baseline probability (0.024). This result is robust to controlling for the reader share
(column 2). We also see that the coverage probability increases with readershare, in line with findings
in Snyder and Strömberg (2010). The point-estimate of 0.24 implies that a 10 percentage point rise in
the reader share increases the reporting probability by 2.4 percentage points (i.e. it doubles the baseline
probability). Interestingly, there is also a large over-reporting of crimes that occur in areas where HQs are
located (column 3). This effect is precisely estimated even when controlling for the reader share, which is
expected to be large in municipalities where a newspaper is edited (column 4). The magnitude of the point
23Crime subcategories are based on the criminal code. These subcategories are: murder/homicide, assassination, passion crime,
infanticide, and negligence.
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estimate is substantial (0.039) and comparable to the impact of a 16 percentage point increase in reader
share. This finding substantiates the first-stage of our instrumental variable strategy in Section 5.
Further results – In Online Appendix Section ?? we further investigate the determinants of news cov-
erage. First, In Table ??, we define whether the perpetrator comes from: i) one of the top-10 countries of
asylum seekers in Switzerland; ii) a predominantly Muslim country; iii) a country that benefits from a free
circulation agreement with Switzerland; and iv) a neighboring country. We do not detect any heterogeneous
effects of foreigni along these different dimensions, except for perpetrators from neighboring countries
(i.e., Austria, France, Germany, and Italy) for which the reporting bias is no longer statistically significant.
Second, we estimate a more flexible specification where the coefficient of foreigni is now newspaper-
specific (Figure ??). All newspapers are more inclined to report foreigner crimes but we find substantial
differences across newspapers, with a coefficient of interest spanning from 0.5 (Le Temps) to 5.4 percent-
age points (20 Minutes F-CH). These differences drive the identifying variations in Section 5. Finally, we
confirm the unconditional evidence by showing that proximity to the date of the referendum increases the
coverage probability (Table ??).
5 News and Voting
In this section, we turn to the core of our empirical analysis and estimate the impact of news coverage
of crime on populist vote. To this end we express our main theoretical Equation (11) into its econometric
counterpart. We start by imposing some structure on the parameters. We first account for out-of-theory
determinants of vote by asserting that the municipality-level average utility shock can be decomposed into
an observable (to the econometrician) and an unobservable component, xenom ≡ X̄mβ + εm, where X̄′m is
a vector of covariates presented below and εm is a white noise. In our baseline specification we assume that
voters process information indiscriminately, i.e. the salience parameter is constrained Sj = 1. Moreover, the
perceived reporting probabilities and the recall frequencies, PCH and RCH, are assumed to be constant across
readerships j. Thus, our baseline econometric specification is defined as
YESm = α× CNEm + X̄′mβ + εm (13)
where YESm, the dependent variable, stands for the share of voters in favor of the minaret ban in municipality
m. Visual inspection of the previous equation reveals that all the theoretical parameters that are unobserved
by the econometrician are conveniently absorbed by the regression coefficient α = ω
NO−ωYES
PCH·(µF−µCH)/RCH . Our
main variable of interest, Crime News Exposure (CNEm), is built under the theoretical guidance of Equa-
tion (11):
CNEm ≡∑
j
sm(j) ·
(
#newsFj
popF
−
#newsCHj
popCH
)
(14)
CNEm averages over-reporting of foreigner crimes across newspapers, using market shares as weights. It
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captures, for a randomly selected voter in municipality m, her news-based inference of the crime differential
between foreigners and natives. In our baseline specifications, the news-related elements of CNEm are mea-
sured over the pre-vote period (Jan 1, 2009 to Nov 29, 2009). Shorter time frames are investigated in our
sensitivity analysis. To circumvent potential endogeneity issues, market shares sm(j) are calculated using
the pre-2009 shares (2006-2008).
We estimate Equation (13) in a cross-section of 1,980 municipalities in 2009. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the district level.24 Summary statistics on the various covariates are provided in Appendix Table A.4.
Note that Italian- and Romansh-speaking municipalities are excluded from our sample as we only collected
German- and French-speaking newspapers.25 Moreover, municipalities in districts where HQs are located
are also excluded (159 municipalities in total) because: (i) we exclude towns where a single newspaper has
a dominant position (Gentzkow et al., 2014) and (ii) we exploit local crime in areas where newspapers have
an headquarter as an exogenous source of variation of news coverage (see below).
5.1 Identification Issues
Our main empirical challenge pertains to the newspapers’ tendency to publish information that confirms
readers’ ideology and beliefs (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010). Demand-driven news provision implies that
market shares of newspapers which over-report foreign criminality tend to be larger in municipalities with
a positive political bias in favor of the minaret ban; this feature potentially leads to a non-zero correlation
between εm and CNEm in the econometric equation (13).
Control variables – A first step in alleviating endogeneity concerns is to control for first-order co-determinants
of CNEm and political preferences. We include a measure of the local Crime Propensity Differential, i.e. the
municipality-level pre-vote difference between foreign and native crime propensity CPDm ≡ #crimeFmpopFm −
#crimeCHm
popCHm
. Indeed, criminality and readership are both spatially clustered, as individuals tend to read local
newspapers and the latter tend to report on local criminality. We also include a measure of past anti-foreigner
vote outcomes at the municipality level.26 The inclusion of past voting outcomes makes our econometric
24Districts in Switzerland are an intermediate administrative unit between the (26) cantons and municipalities. In 2015 there
were 148 districts; an average district comprises 16 municipalities (min=1, max=85).
25In Switzerland there are four official languages: German, French, Italian, and Romansh (a descendant of the Latin spoken in
the Roman Empire). The linguistic partition of the country in 2000 was: German 74%, French 21%, Italian 4%, Romansh 0.6%.
According to the Swiss Statistical Office, among the 2,324 Swiss municipalities, 152 municipalities are Italian- and 28 Romansh-
speaking (on January 1, 2015). Five municipalities in the Bern canton do not have their own electoral office (Hellsau, Meienried,
Niederösch, Oberösch, and Rüti bei Lyssach). These municipalities are treated as absorbed by the municipalities in which their
electoral office is located.
26This variable is constructed as the mean of the vote share in favor of anti-foreigner referenda in the 2000-2008 period: “For
a regulation of immigration” (September 24, 2000), “Against abuses in asylum rights” (November 24, 2002), “Federal decision
on facilitated naturalization of second generation immigrants” (September 26, 2004), “Federal law on foreigners” (September
24, 2006), and “For democratic naturalization” (June 1, 2008). Appendix Figure A.1 displays correlations between historical
anti-foreign votes and the minaret ban referendum. Moreover, to capture partisanship, two referenda with party recommendations
identical to the minaret ban are included: “For the imprescriptibility of acts of child pornography” (March 1, 2006), and “For taking
into account complementary medicines” (May 17, 2009). The use of a principal component with the outcome of these referenda
leaves our result unchanged.
18
model akin to a first difference specification; we essentially correlate deviations from past anti-foreign votes
to the level of crime news exposure over the 11 month period preceding the vote.27 Moreover, we also
include the following municipality characteristics: population size, share of German-speaking population,
share of immigrants, net immigration, sectoral employment, average income, squared average income, ele-
vation, ruggedness, share of active population, share of young population (age 15-35), share of Protestants,
share of Muslims, property crimes, and total market shares of the eleven newspapers included in this analy-
sis. Finally, a set of agglomeration fixed effects is included.28
Instrumental variables – We instrument the news provision component of CNEm in a 2SLS version of
equation (13).29 The key insight comes from our finding in the previous section that proximity to newspaper
headquarters is a powerful predictor of the news coverage of a crime. Hence, for each newspaper j, we com-
pute HQ’s Crime Propensity Differential, i.e. the difference between foreigner and native crime propensity
in its headquarter municipality.30
CPDHQj ≡
#crimeHQFj
popHQF
−
#crimeHQCHj
popHQCH
(15)
We then aggregate across newspapers at the municipality-level to get a variable comparable to CNEm.
This yields a first version of our instrumental variable that we label Headquarters Crime exposure
HQCm ≡∑
j
sm(j) · CPDHQj (16)
Appendix Table A.5 reports some summary statistics on CPDHQj . We see that it ranges from −5.04 (Le
Matin and 24Heures with HQs located in Lausanne) to 19.51 (Tribune de Geneve located in Geneva), with
a cross-newspaper average equal to 4.13. As for the instrumental variable HQCm, the identifying variations
stem from the combination of cross-newspaper variations in CPDHQj and cross-municipality heterogeneity in
market shares sm(j). Our instrumental variable strategy exploits cross-newspaper exogenous variations in
crime news provision that originate from the fact that (i) newspaper headquarters are located in different
27Expressing crime news in level rather than difference makes sense given the short-lived dimension of priming effects and
memory (i.e. imperfect news recall).
28The Swiss Statistical Office defines agglomerations according to three criteria: worker flows, population density, and overnight
hotel stays. The purpose of this purely statistical unit is to overcome historic institutional borders. Agglomerations are determined
according to the intensity of worker flows; this designates the potential agglomeration center and the municipalities that belong to it.
Every potential agglomeration then has to have a minimum number of inhabitants and overnight hotel stays to qualify as such. Note
that the FSO defines as rural municipalities those not belonging to an agglomeration. Here we create a separate, canton-specific
category, i.e. rural municipalities in a specific canton. In 2015 there were 79 agglomerations; an average agglomeration comprises
29 municipalities (min=1, max=271).
29Although instrumenting the news provision is sufficient, we embrace a more comprehensive approach in our robustness
analysis by instrumenting the two components of CNEm, namely news provision
(
#newsFj
popF
− #newsCHjpopCH
)
and market shares sm(j)
(Online Appendix Table ??).
30As for the scaling, CPDHQj is expressed in terms of the number of crimes per 100,000 individuals. For multi-headquarter
newspapers we aggregate both crime and population across headquarter municipalities.
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municipalities, and (ii) spatial proximity of a crime to a headquarter drives news coverage, for cost-related
reasons that are unconnected to the nationality of the perpetrator.
To be a valid instrument HQCm must be orthogonal to the error term εm, after conditioning on the set of
co-variates in Equation (13). To this regard, note that we control for the local Crime Propensity Differential
in order to factor in spatial clustering of criminality (i.e. non-zero correlation between CPDm and CPDHQj ).
However, conditional exogeneity of the instrument is still at risk because of potential spatial correlation
between the unobserved co-determinants of political preferences. For example, in the case of a metropolitan
area where foreigners are discriminated against on the labor market, discontent relative to migrants in the
surrounding municipalities could simultaneously increase with foreigner criminality. This means that mu-
nicipalities close to newspaper headquarters technically belong to the same “xenophobic cluster,” implying
E[εmε
HQ
j ] 6= 0, which in turn questions the exclusion restriction as political preferences and criminality may
correlate in HQs E[CPDHQj ε
HQ
j ] 6= 0. To overcome this problem, we compute the deviation between CPD
HQ
j
(computed over the pre-vote period in 2009) and its long-run counterpart CPDHQj (computed over the post-
vote period 2010-2013).31 The rationale for exploiting short-run deviations is that they can be viewed as
pure sampling errors.32 While the long-run crime propensity of foreigners may correlate with headquarter
characteristics and political preferences, the short-run deviation should not, i.e. E[(CPDHQj −CPD
HQ
j )ε
HQ
j ] = 0.
Aggregating across newspapers, we obtain the second version of our instrumental variable
∆HQCm ≡∑
j
sm(j) ·
(
CPDHQj − CPD
HQ
j
)
(17)
In our baseline analysis we retain the more elaborate version of the instrument, namely that based on
short-run deviations. In our robustness analysis (Section 5.4) the version in level (equation 15) is used and
leads to comparable quantitative results. There we also implement an alternative approach by instrumenting
with the differentials of criminality in municipalities where newspapers have a large audience. Conceptually
this approach is similar to the instrumental strategy developed in Snyder and Strömberg (2010).
5.2 Baseline Results
Inference of crime differentials – Before turning to our main estimation, we first assess the preciseness
of the news-based inference of crime differential. We thus test the null-hypothesis κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj = 0 in Equa-
tion (10). Table A.6 reports both the measured differential and the result of the test for each newspaper.
Crucially, we see that the t-stats are large for all newspapers reporting on at least one crime, confirming that
the null-hypothesis is rejected. The absolute values of the t-stats range from 5.52 (Tages-Anzeiger) to 16.48
31The long-run HQ’s Crime Propensity Differential is defined as CPDHQj ≡
#crimeHQFj
popHQFj
− #crime
HQ
CHj
popHQCHj
where the post-vote long-run
amounts of foreigner and native crimes, #crimeHQ,LRFj and #crime
HQ,LR
CHj , are computed from December 1, 2009 to December 31,
2013. Results are quantitatively similar if the pre-vote period is included.
32This assumption is tested on a set of observable characteristics for the sub-sample of cities experiencing violent crimes during
the 2009-2013 period. Long-run and short-run foreigner criminality do indeed correlate with city characteristics; by contrast,
short-run deviations in criminality do not correlate with observable city characteristics (Figures ??, ??, and ?? in Appendix).
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Table 2: NEWS AND MINARET BAN VOTE - BASELINE RESULTS
Specification Instrument: Short-run deviation of HQ
Crime Propensity Differential (∆HQC)
Reduced 2SLS 2SLS
OLS Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable %Yes %Yes %Yes CNE %Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crime News Exposure (CNE) 2.458a 1.717a 2.474a
(0.840) (0.366) (0.874)
Local Crime Propensity Differential (CPD) 0.269 0.301 0.017 0.259
(0.188) (0.207) (0.019) (0.172)
Past Vote Outcomes 1.001a 1.006a 0.003c 0.999a
(0.040) (0.040) (0.002) (0.041)
HQ Crime Propensity Differential : Deviation (∆HQC) 1.077b 0.436a
(0.427) (0.133)
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Adjusted R2 0.687 0.851 0.850 0.950 0.851
First-stage F-statistic 10.79
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at agglomeration level in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant
at 5%; a significant at 1%. Columns (1) and (2) show the OLS estimates. Columns (3) to (5) present the estimates of our preferred specification, the
2SLS estimation based on the ∆HQCm instrument computed as the short-run Crime Propensity Differential in newspaper headquarter areas (HQCm)
in deviation from its long-run counterpart (HQCLRm ). Municipality characteristics are included in all specifications: population size, share of German-
speaking population, share of immigrants, net immigration, sectoral employment, average income, squared average income, elevation, ruggedness,
share of active population, share of young population (15-35 population), share of Protestants, share of Muslims, property crimes, and total market
shares of the eleven newspapers included in this analysis. Agglomeration fixed effects are included in all specifications.
(20 Minuten). In sum, in our data, comparing crime news between foreigners and natives provides the reader
with a precise, but biased, estimate of the crime propensity differential between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Main results – Table 2 displays the baseline estimation results of Equation (13). Only the (standard-
ized) coefficients of the main variables of interest are reported. Columns (1) and (2) show OLS estimates.
Columns (3) to (5) correspond to our preferred specification, namely the 2SLS estimator with ∆HQCm as
exogenous instrument.33
In column (1) we estimate a parsimonious specification in which we do not include our two most im-
portant control variables, namely past anti-foreign vote outcomes and local CPDm. The two controls are
included in column (2). We see that Crime News Exposure has a positive and statistically significant effect
33Estimations results based on the instrument in level, HQCm, are presented in Table ??, columns (1) to (3).
21
in both specifications, with the inclusion of controls leading to an improvement in precision. Effects are
sizable: a one-standard deviation increase in CNEm translates into a 22% standard-deviation increase in the
vote share in favor of the minaret ban (column 2). We interpret the positive coefficient of CPDm as direct
evidence supporting our theoretical assumption of crime priming. This result must, however, be viewed
with reservation as the parameter is not precisely estimated (p-value is 0.16). Furthermore, we see that past
anti-foreign vote outcome is a powerful control with a point estimate close to 1, illustrating the high level
of persistence in anti-foreigner attitudes at the municipality-level. This precisely estimated unitary coeffi-
cient makes our econometric model akin to a first difference specification (i.e. change in political attitudes
regressed on crime news). It also confirms the unconditional evidence depicted on Figure A.1 showing that
the minaret ban vote had a strong anti-foreigner and populist component. Overall, the precision and sign of
the estimated coefficients on the control variables are encouraging for the quality of our data.
We now turn to our instrumental variable approach in the remaining columns of Table 2. Column (3)
presents the reduced-form estimates, and columns (4) and (5) report the first and second-stage regression
results. Reduced-form estimates show that the instrument has a positive and significant effect on the pro-ban
vote. In the first-stage estimation, the sign of the estimated coefficient of the instrument and the magnitude
of the Kleibergen-Paap (KP) F-statistics confirm that criminality in the neighborhood of a newspaper’s
headquarters is a powerful predictor of crime news provision. Moreover, past vote is a poor predictor of
news provision. This is reassuring as it suggests that our concern relative to demand-driven news provision
is in fact limited (see the above discussion on endogeneity). The second stage estimated coefficient of CNEm
is precisely estimated and close to its OLS counterpart. Column (5) is our preferred specification in the
remainder of the paper, upon which our sensitivity analysis rests.
Other theoretical predictions – In Table A.7 we look at more flexible versions of our econometric model.
We aim at documenting additional theoretical channels related to sophistication in voters’ information pro-
cessing (see our theoretical discussion at the end of Section 3).
We start with the elicitation of the salience parameter to gauge whether readers differently value the
informational content of foreigner/native crime news. For the econometric implementation of this exercise,
we retain the same restrictions on the structural parameters as in our baseline model except for the salience
parameter S, which we now let unconstrained (but still constant across newspapers j). We then consider
a model identical to the baseline one, now splitting our main explanatory variable CNEm into its foreigner
(F) and native (N) news components, each with its own regression coefficient. Visual inspection of our
structural Equation (11) shows that (i) these two coefficients must have opposite signs and (ii) (the absolute
value of) their ratio yields an estimate of the salience parameter. In columns (1) and (2) we estimate OLS
and 2SLS models respectively – note that our instrumental variable ∆HQCm is now also split into its foreigner
and native crime components. In both models, results show that the coefficients exhibit the expected sign
pattern, positive for foreigner crime news and negative for native crime news. This finding supports our key
theoretical argument, namely that voters care about the crime differential between natives and foreigners.
Hence, news coverage of native crimes tends to reduce the populist vote. That said, however, the magnitudes
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are different and voters react more to foreigner crime news: in the 2SLS specification, the implied value
of the salience parameter is equal to 1.84 (= 5.26/2.86). In comparison, the salience parameter of a
sophisticated reader, namely an agent without selective recall and perfect knowledge of the extent of the
media bias, should be equal to 0.55.34 In other words, in our data the average voter weights foreigner crime
news 84% more than native news, in stark contrast with the sophisticated voter who weights them (about)
half less. According to our theoretical discussion, this result can be interpreted in two non-excludable ways:
readers more selectively recall foreigner crime news and/or they underestimate the extent of media bias. As
a consequence, readers do not manage to "debias" news and actually overreact to foreigner crime news.
In columns (3) and (4) we investigate the heterogeneous effects of crime news on votes across newspaper
types. Estimating newspaper-specific coefficients is too demanding given the data, in particular because
eleven instrumental variables would need to be included (one per newspaper). We therefore implement a less
ambitious and more realistic approach by considering only two categories – tabloids and regular newspapers
– and split our main explanatory (CNEm) and instrumental variable (∆HQCm) accordingly. The classification
of newspapers into tabloid/regular is based on that of Medienqualitatsrating Schweiz, an organization that
rates the quality of media in Switzerland.35 In column (3) we replicate the baseline OLS specification
with a coefficient of CNEm that is specific to each category; in column (4) we estimate the 2SLS version.
2SLS coefficients are precisely estimated and are not significantly different from each other. Hence, the
quantitative effect of crime news on voting behavior is comparable for readerships of tabloids and regular
newspapers. This surprising result is nonetheless in line with our theoretical model: tabloids tend to frame
news in a more memorable way, but the informational value of news is higher in regular newspapers. Our
empirical result suggests that these two channels have the same quantitative impact and compensate one
another.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Pooling Schemes
Our baseline analysis assumes that voters contrast crime news between two pools of perpetrators, Swiss
and foreigners. Indeed, pooling enables voters to process the informational content of news in a way that
is both accurate and cognitively simple. Although the Swiss/foreigner divide sounds natural and relevant
in our context, the pooling scheme used by voters is in fact unobservable to the econometrician. In what
follows, we successfully test the robustness of our results to alternative schemes.
Pooling rule – Let us posit that voters assign nationalities reported in the crime news to two pools based
on the share of Muslims (small/large) among their citizens living in Switzerland – the threshold being set
34Let us assume that a sophisticated reader exerts no selective recall and has a perfect knowledge of the extent of the media bias.
In terms of parameter values, this means that her recall frequencies are identical RF/RCH = 1 and her perception of the media bias
corresponds to the actual bias (see Section 4) such that PF/PCH = 0.031/0.017. We obtain a value of the salience parameter equal
to S ≡ RF/RCH
PF/PCH
= 0.55.
35In our sample, three newspapers are classified as tabloids by Medienqualitatsrating Schweiz: 20 Minuten, 20 Minutes, and Le
Matin. Tabloids are standardly defined as popular newspapers with many pictures and short, simple reports. They tend to publish
sensational stories and contain images of large shock value. They are usually viewed as big providers of crime news, a feature that
is borne out in our data.
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at the median of the distribution of Muslim shares in Switzerland (2.7%). Equipped with this alternative
pooling rule, Equation (13) is now estimated with the following, slightly modified, version of CNEm
CNE′m ≡∑
j
sm(j) ·
(
#newsMj
popM
−
#newsMj
popM
)
(18)
where M (M) corresponds to the pool of nationalities with a Muslim share in Switzerland above (below)
2.7%. Note that, in the data, the size of M is large enough (495,688 individuals and condition (7) is satisfied)
for the news-based inference procedure of the crime propensity differential to be accurate. Indeed, under
this alternative pooling, the null-hypothesis κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj = 0 is rejected for all newspapers but one (unreported
results).
Stereotypes – The previous pooling rule raises concerns about its plausibility. Indeed, voters, in their vast
majority, have an incomplete and stereotyped view of the distribution of Muslim shares across nationali-
ties.36 Rooted in social psychology (Schneider, 2004), a recent strand of the literature proposes practical
tools for taking into account individuals’ tendency to save on cognitive resources. It is in this spirit that we
apply to our setting the representativeness-based discounting approach developed by Bordalo et al. (2016)
and compute the following measure of the stereotyped Muslim share (µsn)
µsn = µn ×
(µn/µCH)θ
µn · (µn/µCH)θ + (1− µn) · ((1− µn)/(1− µCH))θ
(19)
where the stereotyping parameter θ is a non-negative that captures the extent to which representativeness of
the Muslim trait for nationality n (i.e. µn/µCH) distorts voters’ beliefs – their reference point being the Mus-
lim share among Swiss nationals. An increase in θ leads to more stereotyping and a perceived distribution
of Muslim shares that becomes more polarized. At the extreme, θ = 0 corresponds to the no-stereotyping
case while θ = +∞ leads to perceived shares equal to 0 or 1. In Figure A.3, we apply this approach to our
data to show how θ affects the distribution of perceived Muslim shares. We consider six scenarios, ranging
from θ = 0 (no-stereotype) to θ = 10. As shown in the figure, increasing θ has a significant impact on
the polarization of the distribution of perceived shares (in red), with a drastic expansion of the number of
nationalities perceived as highly Muslim. Finally, for a given θ we use the stereotyped shares µsn in order to
re-compute the pools (M,M) according to the rule described above, and then use Equation (18) to re-compute
CNE′m.
37
36Some cases are relatively unambiguous: Peruvian migrants are mostly non-Muslim, while 99% of Tunisian migrants are
Muslim. Other cases are, however, less clear in part due to ethnic and religious selection to migration. For example, while half of
the population in Nigeria is Muslim, this is true of only 6% of the Nigerians in Switzerland. Similarly, Azerbaijan is 97% Muslim,
but only 25 % of the migrants from this country practice Islam in Switzerland. Religious fragmentation is another factor. One in
five migrants in Switzerland come from the Balkans, where disparity in terms of religious affiliation is very large (e.g. Muslims
represent less than 5% of the population in Croatia and Serbia versus 59% in Albania and 96% in Kosovo).
37Unreported results show that, if anything, a larger θ improves the accuracy of the news-based inference procedure, e.g. for
θ ≥ 1, the absolute values of the t-stats stand above 3 across all newspapers (under the null-hypothesis κ̂Mj − κ̂
NM
j = 0).
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Results – Table A.8 displays the estimates of the 2SLS regressions when we include CNE′m instead of
CNEm in Equation (13). The coding of the instrumental variable ∆HQCm is also adjusted, such that crimes
in headquarters areas are now assigned to the pools (M,M).38 Each column corresponds to a particular value
of θ. When assuming that voters pool the nationalities according to the real Muslim shares (column (1),
θ = 0), or that belief distortion is weak (column (2), θ = 1), the effect is positive but not precisely
estimated. Moreover, the first-stage KP-stats are low (below 8). When beliefs on the Muslim shares are
more distorted (θ ∈ {2, 3, 5, 10}), the CNEm estimates are positive and statistically significant (columns (3)
to (6)), and the KP-stats above 10. Given the issue with weak instruments when θ ≤ 1, we also perform OLS
estimations (Table A.9), observing that the effect of CNEm on vote is positive and statistically significant in
all six scenarios, even for low θs.
No pooling – We now depart from the pooling assumption by allowing voters to infer the crime differ-
ential of Muslims by directly estimating equation (8) across nationalities. Beyond the theoretical caveats
discussed in Section 3, this approach suffers from two empirical limitations. First, with many nationalities
experiencing no crime, the crime differential (κMj − κNMj ) is not precisely estimated (i.e. a large p-value of the
coefficient of µn in equation (8)). Second, our instrumental variable strategy is not suited to this setup. Nev-
ertheless, we can still estimate a OLS version of Equation (13) where our main explanatory variable CNEm
is now equal to ∑j sm(j) ·
(
κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj
)
. The estimation results are reported in column (1) of Table A.10. We
clearly see that the coefficient of interest is not precisely estimated. In columns (2) to (6), we assess the
impact of stereotyping in this setup by using the stereotyped Muslim shares µsn in equation (8). Statistical
significance is restored when stereotyping becomes large (θ ≥ 5).
5.4 Other Sensitivity Checks and Alternative Instruments.
We report here a brief summary of various sensitivity exercises. All tables and figures and further
discussion can be found in the Online Appendix Section ??. The baseline results (column (5) in Table 2) are
robust to i) alternative definitions of the pre-vote time window, from two to eleven months (Appendix Figure
A.4); ii) controlling for criminality in municipalities where people work (Table ??); iii) alternative coding
rules of news that do not report on nationalities (Figure ?? and Table ??); iv) correcting for cross-sectional
spatial correlation, applying the method developed by Conley (1999) and Colella et al. (2018) (Table ??);
v) weighting by the precision of news-based inference (Table A.6); (vi) adding out-of-sample newspapers
(Figure ??).
In the Online Appendix Section ?? we scrutinize the following alternative constructions of the instru-
mental variable: i) instrument in level, HQCm as defined in Equation (16), (Table ??); (ii) instrument in
difference, ∆HQCm, where long-run crime is filtered out in a flexible way (Table ??); iii) instrument based
38Note that our alternative pooling rule leads to endogenous and instrumental variables that differ significantly from the baseline.
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the endogenous variable in the baseline and in the six alternative scenarios range from
0.72 to 0.74. Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the instrument in the baseline and in the six alternative scenarios range
from 0.01 (column 6) to 0.73 (column 1).
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on crime differential in municipalities with large readerships (Table ??); iv) extra instrument for market
shares of newspapers based on spatial proximity to headquarters (Table ??); and v) instrument based on
news pressure on crime days (Table ??). All in all, the baseline results are qualitatively unchanged.
5.5 Falsification Exercises
In this sub-section we undertake a set of falsification exercises to assess the validity of the exclusion
restriction.
Post-referendum news – We first evaluate the impact of post-vote crime news on the minaret ban vote.
The estimates are depicted in Figure A.4. Reassuringly, crime news released after the minaret ban vote have
no impact on its outcome.
Placebo outcome – A second test exploits voting outcomes that are unrelated to immigration issues. On
the same day as the minaret ban referendum (November 29, 2009), Swiss citizens also voted on: the “Cre-
ation of special funding for tasks in the area of air traffic”.39 The first two columns of Table A.11 present the
results when using vote in favor of the Air Traffic Funding instead of the minaret ban as the outcome. First,
we estimate the reduced-form regression from Table 2, column (3); reassuringly, neither crime in newspa-
pers’ headquarters nor local crime has an effect on the outcome of the Air Traffic Funding vote (column
1). Second, we estimate the full two-stage least squares estimation. Not surprisingly, given the results of
column (1), the coefficient of crime coverage is not statistically significant (column 2).
Unread newspapers – In the last four columns of Table A.11 we turn to falsification of the instrument.
Our instrumental strategy rests on the fact that newspapers are more likely to report on crimes occurring
in the vicinity of their headquarters. If the exclusion restriction holds, the voting behavior of individuals
should not be impacted by crimes that occur in the vicinity of headquarters of the newspapers that they do
not read.
To implement this exercise, we rely on a modified version of the baseline reduced-form regression
(column 3, Table 2). Indeed, since municipality-level market shares are by definition zero for unread news-
papers, we replace market share by one of its powerful (negative) predictors, namely spatial distance to HQs.
In column (3), as a way of benchmarking, we estimate this modified version, focusing on the set of news-
papers that are actually read in the municipality (non-zero market shares). Reassuringly, the coefficient of
interest is statistically significant; it is negative given that distance to HQs negatively predicts market-share.
This finding confirms the baseline result. In column (4) we replicate this specification by focusing on the set
of newspapers that are not read. We see that the coefficient is small in magnitude, not statistically significant,
and has the wrong sign. In other words, crimes close to the HQs of unread newspapers do not affect vote in
favor of the minaret ban; only crimes occurring near HQs of read newspapers have an impact. In this same
39In French, the Arrêté fédéral du 03.10.2008 sur la création d’un financement spécial en faveur de tâches dans le domaine du
trafic aérien. For simplicity, we hereon refer to this object as "Air Traffic Funding."
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vein, in columns (5) and (6) we exploit the fact that several languages are spoken in Switzerland. We start
by restricting to outlets edited in the language spoken in the municipality. As in column (3), the reduced-
form estimates are negative and statistically significant. In column (6) we then focus on newspapers that are
written in a language not spoken in the municipality. Here again, we see a loss of statistical significance.
5.6 Quantification and Policy Experiments
We now simulate two counterfactual experiments in order to quantify the impact of crime news on the
minaret ban vote. We first look at an experiment where newspapers are forced to report on criminality in an
unbiased way. Second, and more closely linked to a debated policy option, we consider a law preventing
newspapers from disclosing perpetrators’ nationalities.40
Counterfactual #1: Unbiased news – The quantification procedure exploits the full structure of the
model. In a first step, we compute the counterfactual coverage probabilities in a world without media
bias. To this aim, we use the media coverage model of Section 4. Let Puij denote the “unbiased” probability
of perpetrator i being covered by newspaper j. We predict Puij from the estimation of Equation (12) after
setting the coefficient of foreigni to zero.
41 In a second step, we sum Puij across foreign/native perpetrators
to get #newsuFj and #news
u
CHj, namely the counterfactual crime news reported in newspaper j. In a third step,
we calculate municipality-level crime news exposure, CNEum according to equation (14). In a fourth step,
we predict the counterfactual municipality-level vote outcome by replacing CNEm with CNEum in the baseline
estimates of Table 2, column (5). All in all, we find that the pro-ban vote would decrease on average by 4.1
percentage points in the absence of any media bias.
Counterfactual #2: No reporting of nationality – The previous thought experiment suffers from an
important limitation: the practical implementation of a policy aiming to suppress media bias is rather un-
feasible, in part because the latter may be unintentional. We consequently turn to a more plausible policy
option by studying the impact of a law forbidding journalists from releasing details on criminals’ nation-
alities. Technically, this is equivalent to setting #newsF and #newsCH to zero. We can then recompute the
corresponding counterfactual crime news exposure CNEcm and predict the counterfactual municipality-level
vote outcome by using CNEcm in the baseline estimates of Table 2, column (5). Our quantification shows
that the pro-ban vote shares in this scenario would have decreased by 4.5 percentage points on average
across municipalities. At the national level, this translates into a 5 percentage point decrease (from 57.6%
to 52.6%). By comparison, the share of highly educated people at the municipality level should increase by
72% to generate an effect of this magnitude.
40Relative to debate on nationality reporting in Switzerland, see "La police de Zurich pourra taire la nationalité de personnes
interpellées" (RTS, November 7, 2017, in French) for Zurich and "Taire la nationalité des délinquants" (Le Courrier, December 5,
2017, in French) for Geneva.
41We take into account the dramatic increase in media bias observed in the pre-vote period (Table ??) by considering a scenario
where the offender’s nationality has on average no effect and no extra-effect in the three-month period before the referendum.
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Quantitatively, forbidding newspapers from reporting on perpetrators’ nationality generates very similar
effects as targeting unbiased news. Such a policy is, in fact, already in place in other European countries,
notably Germany and Sweden, and has similarly been implemented in the canton of Zurich.42 While it has
the virtue of being easily enforceable, the policy comes as at the expense of exerting control over media.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of news coverage of immigrant criminality on populist vote. Switzerland,
with its direct democracy and cultural heterogeneity is an ideal laboratory for assessing the complex interac-
tion between news provision and voting decisions. We scrutinize one of the most controversial referenda in
recent years: the 2009 vote on banning the construction of minarets. We first document an over-reporting of
immigrant criminality that is not driven by standard determinants of coverage (e.g. reader share), and then
estimate a theory-based voting equation in the cross-section of municipalities. Our instrumentation strategy
uses spatial proximity to newspapers’ headquarters as a source of exogenous variations in the coverage of a
crime. Counterfactual simulations show that, under a law forbidding newspapers to disclose a perpetrator’s
nationality, the vote in favor of the ban would have decreased by 5 percentage points (from 57.6% to 52.6%).
Our study sheds light on the crucial role of media coverage in electoral dynamics involving right-wing
populist rhetoric. The success of populism often rests on a logic of fear and scapegoatism, with political
programs denouncing real or imaginary threats against the interests of the common people. The findings in
this paper show how newspapers contribute to shaping the perception of such threats by constituencies. A
similar logic has, in fact, recently been observed in several other advanced economies where immigration
and criminality were salient topics during electoral campaigns. The refugee crisis was, for example, at the
center of public debate in the 2018 legislative campaign in Italy, in the 2017 legislative election in Austria,
and in the 2017 German Federal election. In his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump frequently
referred to the dangerousness of immigrants and Islam and those allegations were relayed by many media.
Over the last three decades, concerns about the violence of second-generation immigrants in the French
suburbs have overwhelmed public and political debate in the country’s media. Such unease contributed to
making the populist National Front party the foremost political force in France in 2014. To this regard, an
unaddressed question in this paper relates to the complex interplay between media agenda-setting and the
communication strategies of political parties. Understanding why and how populist rhetoric is relayed by
the mass media is a fascinating and overlooked question that begs further research.
42In Germany until 2017 non-binding guidelines stated that the ethnicity or religion of a criminal in a police investigation should
only be reported when it "can be justified as being relevant to the reader’s understanding of the incident". New rules were then
adopted in that same year, after German outlets’ credibility was called into question in the aftermath of the Cologne sexual assaults
and newspapers’ failure to report on the events until several days had passed. The new guidelines state that “the journalist should
be careful when reporting on criminality that the mentioning of the suspect’s ethnic or religious identity does not lead to a general
discrimination based on one individual’s actions”, and that “in general ethnicity should not be mentioned unless there is a plausible
public interest in doing so”. Similarly, the “Code of Ethics for Press, Radio and Television” in Sweden recommend that media “do
not emphasize ethnic origin, [...] nationality [...] in the case of the persons concerned if this is not important in the specific context
or is demeaning”. In both cases, these measures also provide broad guidelines on what type of information should be reported by
the police to the press.
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A Appendix - Tables & Figures
Table A.1: CRIME NEWS PROVISION: MEDIA BIAS
Newspaper (j) Foreign Native Bias
PFj News P
CH
j News Bj
20 Minuten D-CH 0.081 30 0.055 17 0.466
20 Minutes F-CH 0.064 22 0.015 4 3.340
24 Heures 0.047 16 0.018 5 1.546
Matin dimanche, Le 0.000 0 0.004 1 -1.000
Matin, Le (lu - sa) 0.038 11 0.015 4 1.604
NZZ am Sonntag 0.000 0 0.000 0 .
Neue Zuercher Zeitung 0.060 17 0.051 16 0.157
SonntagsZeitung 0.000 0 0.000 0 .
St. Galler Tagblatt 0.008 2 0.007 1 0.177
Tages-Anzeiger 0.038 10 0.022 7 0.736
Temps, Le 0.004 2 0.004 1 0.157
Tribune de Geneve 0.026 9 0.007 2 2.472
Notes: The unit of observation is a crime perpetrator. Crime data comes from the Swiss Statistical Office (FSO). News data collected by the authors.
Statistics for 2009 and 2010. Over the 507 aggressors, 235 of them are foreigners. PFj(PCHj) represents the newspaper-specific unconditional
probablity of news coverage of a crime commited by a foreign (native) aggressor. News is the total number of news related to foreign (native)
aggressor. Bj ≡ (PFj −PCHj)/PCHj.
Table A.2: CRIME NEWS PROVISION: PRE- AND POST-VOTE PATTERNS
Newspaper (j) Foreign Native Bias
PF News PCH News Bj
2009 and 2010 0.031 119 0.017 58 0.858
2009: Full year 0.045 74 0.025 37 0.836
2010: Full year 0.020 45 0.011 21 0.859
2009: Before vote 0.045 68 0.025 34 0.806
3 months before vote 0.079 31 0.023 5 2.478
3 months after vote 0.022 13 0.008 6 1.598
Notes: The unit of observation is a crime perpetrator. Crime data comes from the Swiss Statistical Office (FSO). News data collected by the authors.
PFj(PCHj) represents the newspaper-specific unconditional probablity of news coverage of a crime commited by a foreign (native) aggressor. News
is the total number news related to foreign (native) aggressor. Bj ≡ (PFj −PCHj)/PCHj.
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Table A.3: CRIME NEWS PROVISION: EFFECT OF VOTE ON VIOLENT CRIME
Dep Variable: Crime All Foreign Swiss % Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Votem –0.352 –0.273 –0.394 –0.362 –0.274 –0.131 –0.031 –0.062
(0.283) (0.307) (0.309) (0.333) (0.340) (0.370) (0.195) (0.212)
Votem,m−1 –0.065 –0.012 0.113 –0.107
(0.362) (0.393) (0.436) (0.249)
Votem−1,m−2 0.419 0.381 0.421 –0.090
(0.301) (0.326) (0.362) (0.207)
Votem−2,m−3 0.250 –0.058 0.437 –0.135
(0.286) (0.310) (0.344) (0.197)
Votem,m+1 0.102 0.032 0.255 –0.039
(0.337) (0.366) (0.406) (0.232)
Votem+1,m+2 0.109 0.559 –0.194 0.357
(0.434) (0.471) (0.522) (0.299)
Votem+2,m+3 –0.252 –0.579 –0.004 –0.354
(0.363) (0.394) (0.437) (0.250)
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
R2 0.101 0.132 0.133 0.174 0.089 0.116 0.181 0.208
F-Test equality coeff. 0.10 0.00 0.65 0.45
F-Stat p-value 0.76 0.97 0.42 0.50
Notes: The unit of observation is a week-year. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. Linear probability model estimations.
Year and month fixed effects fixed effects are included.
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Table A.4: NEWS AND MINARET BAN VOTE - SUMMARY STATISTICS
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Minaret Ban ”Yes” Vote (%) 1980 63.27 10.48 32.43 96.00
Crime News Exposure (CNE) 1980 0.07 0.87 –1.72 1.93
HQ Crime Propensity Differential : Deviation (∆HQC) 1980 –0.12 0.90 –2.79 1.12
Past Vote Outcomes 1980 49.39 9.86 14.94 76.44
Local Crime Propensity Differential (CPD) 1980 0.03 1.04 –1.31 7.28
German-speaking (%) 1980 68.94 43.21 0.00 100.00
Log population 1980 7.22 1.22 3.30 11.51
Immigrants (%) 1980 13.27 8.92 0.00 59.67
Net Immigration (%) 1980 0.63 0.78 –4.90 5.87
High-skilled (%) 1980 31.33 8.14 6.38 64.40
Secondary Employment (%) 1980 23.88 7.46 0.00 52.89
Tertiary Employment (%) 1980 53.90 8.85 16.18 82.59
Log Net Income (ChF) 1980 11.01 0.25 9.93 12.98
Log Net Income Squared 1980 121.18 5.53 98.66 168.50
Elevation (km) 1980 0.77 0.46 0.26 3.02
Ruggedness 1980 138.60 167.68 2.54 848.60
Active (%) 1980 49.60 5.83 25.54 100.00
Young (%) 1980 23.83 3.44 10.47 49.29
Protestants (%) 1980 47.69 29.16 0.00 99.43
Muslim (%) 1980 2.84 3.18 0.00 20.44
Newspaper Market Shares 1980 0.57 0.25 0.12 1.00
Local Property Crime 1980 4.61 16.01 0.00 344.00
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality. Vote data comes from the Swiss Statistical Office (FSO). News data collected by the authors.
Crime data comes from the Swiss Statistical Office (FSO). Newspaper circulation data comes from the Research and Studies in Advertising Media
Association (WEMF/REMP). Other municipality characteristics data comes from the Swiss Statistical Office (FSO). CNE constructed using articles
published in from Jan 1, 2009 to Nov 29, 2009. ∆HQC, Local Crime Propensity Differential, Local Property Crime constructed using crime data
from Jan 1, 2009 to Nov 29, 2009. Newspaper Market Shares constructed for the 2006-2008 period. All other variables are constructed for the year
2009 with the exception of sectoral employment, language, religion, and skills level that are constructed using data from 2000.
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Table A.5: NEWS AND MINARET BAN VOTE - IDENTIFYING VARIATIONS
Crime Propensity Crime Propensity
Crimes (#) Differential Differential
Newspaper Short-Run Short-Run Deviation
F CH HQC HQC− HQCLR
20 Minuten D-CH 23 25 5.87 1.27
20 Minutes F-CH 23 13 10.41 9.68
24 Heures 1 5 -5.04 -8.86
Matin dimanche, Le 1 5 -5.04 -8.86
Matin, Le (lu - sa) 1 5 -5.04 -8.86
NZZ am Sonntag 9 12 3.67 -0.18
Neue Zuercher Zeitung 9 12 3.67 -0.18
SonntagsZeitung 11 13 4.46 1.32
Tages-Anzeiger 9 12 3.67 -0.18
Temps, Le 39 28 9.24 6.63
Tribune de Geneve 22 8 19.51 21.26
Average newspaper 13.45 12.55 4.13 1.18
Notes: Population and crime calculated at newspaper level, i.e. summing local populations and local crimes in municipalities hosting a headquarter.
Crime data comes from the Swiss Statistical Office (FSO). The crime propensity differential short run, HQC ≡ #crime
HQ
F
popHQF
− #crime
HQ
CH
popHQCH
, is computed
over the period Jan 1, 2009 to Nov 30, 2009. HQCLR is calculated over the period Dec 1, 2009 to Dec 31, 2013.
Table A.6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: ACCURACY OF CRIME PROPENSITY DIFFERENTIAL INFERENCE
Newspaper (j) Pre-Vote News
κ̂Mj − κ̂NMj t-stat
20 Minuten D-CH 32.55 16.48
20 Minutes F-CH 24.28 15.12
24 Heures 11.88 10.45
Matin dimanche, Le -0.52 -8.14
Matin, Le (lu - sa) 10.04 9.53
NZZ am Sonntag 0.00 .
Neue Zuercher Zeitung 10.63 8.68
SonntagsZeitung 0.00 .
Tages-Anzeiger 4.80 5.52
Temps, Le 3.69 6.09
Tribune de Geneve 10.56 10.04
Notes: Crime and population data comes from the Swiss Statistical Office (FSO). News data collected by the authors. News-based crime
propensity differentials (CPD) and accuracy test (i.e. two-sample t-test for equal mean performed on the Foreign and Native subsamples of
news). Test statistic (t-stat) reported. News-based CPD and t-stat are calculated on the pre-vote period. News-based CPD is computed as
1
PCHj/RCHj
×
(
Sj ·
#newsFj
popF
− #newsCHjpopCH
)
for each newspaper. CPD calculated per 100,000 inhabitants. Foreign and Native populations are 1,701,912
and 6,071,802 respectively. Probability of coverage (PCHj and PFj) set at the mean (0.037). Recall frequencies (RCHj and RFj) set to 1.
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Table A.7: NEWS AND MINARET BAN VOTE - OTHER TESTABLE PREDICTIONS
Specification Swiss versus Foreign News Tabloids versus Non-Tabloids
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime News Exposure : Swiss Crimes –2.481c –2.858c
(1.430) (1.697)
Crime News Exposure : Foreign Crimes 3.949a 5.255b
(1.408) (2.028)
Crime News Exposure : Tabloids 1.164b 2.391a
(0.447) (0.754)
Crime News Exposure : Non-Tabloids –0.272 3.656c
(1.039) (2.008)
Past Vote Outcomes 0.999a 0.997a 1.000a 1.002a
(0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.042)
Local Crime Propensity Differential (CPD) 0.275 0.262 0.274 0.254
(0.189) (0.170) (0.189) (0.184)
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980
Adjusted R2 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.850
First-stage F-statistic 9.74 10.70
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at agglomeration level in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant
at 5%; a significant at 1%. Columns (1) and (3) show OLS estimates. Columns (2) to (4) present the second-stage estimates of 2SLS regressions.
Columns (1) and (2) show estimates where news-based CPD is computed for Native and Foreigners separately. Columns (2) and (3) present estimates
where CPD is computed for tabloids and non-tabloids separately. The tabloid versus non-tabloid classification comes from Medienqualitatsrating
Schweiz (see www.mqr-schweiz.ch). Newspapers classified as tabloid in our sample are 20 Minuten, 20 Minutes, and Le Matin. The other
newspapers in our sample are classified as non-tabloid . Municipality characteristics are included in all specifications: population size, share of
German-speaking population, share of immigrants, net immigration, sectoral employment, average income, squared average income, elevation,
ruggedness, share of active population, share of young population (15-35 population), share of Protestants, share of Muslims, property crimes, and
total market shares of the eleven newspapers included in this analysis. Agglomeration fixed effects are included in all specifications.
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Table A.8: NEWS AND MINARET BAN VOTE : ALTERNATIVE POOLING (2SLS)
Dependent Variable %Yes
Stereotype parameter θ = 0 θ = 1 θ = 2 θ = 3 θ = 5 θ = 10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crime News Exposure (CNE) 0.890 1.848 1.603b 1.581b 1.533b 1.445c
(1.278) (1.143) (0.779) (0.776) (0.768) (0.762)
Past Vote Outcomes 1.001a 0.999a 0.999a 1.000a 1.000a 1.000a
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Local Crime Propensity Differential (CPD) 0.263 0.262c 0.261c 0.262c 0.274c 0.278c
(0.177) (0.153) (0.155) (0.155) (0.153) (0.152)
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Adjusted R2 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851
First-stage F-statistic 6.42 7.48 11.37 11.61 12.05 13.06
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at agglomeration level in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant
at 5%; a significant at 1%. Alternative pooling scheme described in details in Section 5.3. 2SLS estimations in all specifications. News and crimes
are pooled in two groups based on the nationality of the perpetrators: low (below 2.7%) versus large (above 2.7%) share of Muslims. Applying the
representativeness-based discounting approach developed by Bordalo et al. (2016), we assume that voters distort beliefs on the shares of Muslims
accordingly. θ is a parameter that captures the extent to which representativeness distorts beliefs. At the extreme, θ = 0 corresponds to the no-
stereotyping case while θ = +∞ leads to perceived shares equal to 0 or 1. Columns (1) to (6) present six pecifications based on alternative levels
of stereotyping, ranging from θ = 0 to θ = 10. Municipality characteristics are included in all specifications: population size, share of German-
speaking population, share of immigrants, net immigration, sectoral employment, average income, squared average income, elevation, ruggedness,
share of active population, share of young population (15-35 population), share of Protestants, share of Muslims, property crimes, and total market
shares of the eleven newspapers included in this analysis. Agglomeration fixed effects are included in all specifications.
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Table A.9: NEWS AND MINARET BAN VOTE : ALTERNATIVE POOLING (OLS)
Dependent Variable %Yes
Stereotype parameter θ = 0 θ = 1 θ = 2 θ = 3 θ = 5 θ = 10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crime News Exposure (CNE) 1.631a 1.655a 1.562a 1.564a 1.565a 1.571a
(0.337) (0.340) (0.325) (0.325) (0.327) (0.326)
Past Vote Outcomes 1.000a 1.000a 1.000a 1.000a 1.000a 1.000a
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Local Crime Propensity Differential (CPD) 0.258 0.263c 0.262c 0.262c 0.274c 0.278c
(0.169) (0.157) (0.157) (0.156) (0.153) (0.150)
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Adjusted R2 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at agglomeration level in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant
at 5%; a significant at 1%. Alternative pooling scheme described in details in Section 5.3. OLS estimations in all specifications. News and crimes
are pooled in two groups based on the nationality of the perpetrators: low (below 2.7%) versus large (above 2.7%) share of Muslims. Applying the
representativeness-based discounting approach developed by Bordalo et al. (2016), we assume that voters distort beliefs on the shares of Muslims
accordingly. θ is a parameter that captures the extent to which representativeness distorts beliefs. At the extreme, θ = 0 corresponds to the no-
stereotyping case while θ = +∞ leads to perceived shares equal to 0 or 1. Columns (1) to (6) present six pecifications based on alternative levels
of stereotyping, ranging from θ = 0 to θ = 10. Municipality characteristics are included in all specifications: population size, share of German-
speaking population, share of immigrants, net immigration, sectoral employment, average income, squared average income, elevation, ruggedness,
share of active population, share of young population (15-35 population), share of Protestants, share of Muslims, property crimes, and total market
shares of the eleven newspapers included in this analysis. Agglomeration fixed effects are included in all specifications.
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Table A.10: NEWS AND MINARET BAN VOTE - NO POOLING ACROSS PERPETRATORS’ NATIONALITIES
Dependent Variable %Yes
Stereotype parameter θ = 0 θ = 1 θ = 2 θ = 3 θ = 5 θ = 10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crime News Exposure : No Pooling –0.572 –0.646 –0.680 –0.254 1.242b 1.192b
(0.539) (0.551) (0.560) (0.700) (0.478) (0.482)
Past Vote Outcomes 1.003a 1.003a 1.003a 1.004a 1.001a 1.001a
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Local Crime Propensity Differential (CPD) 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.290 0.290
(0.213) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.208) (0.209)
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Adjusted R2 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at agglomeration level in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at
5%; a significant at 1%. OLS estimations. Crime News Exposure is computed with an estimate of κMj − κNMj (based on Equation (8). This estimation
relies on the share of Muslims across nationalities. Applying the representativeness-based discounting approach developed by Bordalo et al. (2016),
we assume that voters distort beliefs on the shares of Muslims accordingly. θ is a parameter that captures the extent to which representativeness
distorts beliefs. At the extreme, θ = 0 corresponds to the no-stereotyping case while θ = +∞ leads to perceived shares equal to 0 or 1. Columns
(1) to (6) present six pecifications based on alternative levels of stereotyping, ranging from θ = 0 to θ = 10. Municipality characteristics are
included in all specifications: population size, share of German-speaking population, share of immigrants, net immigration, sectoral employment,
average income, squared average income, elevation, ruggedness, share of active population, share of young population (15-35 population), share
of Protestants, share of Muslims, property crimes, and total market shares of the eleven newspapers included in this analysis. Agglomeration fixed
effects are included in all specifications.
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Table A.11: NEWS AND VOTING: FALSIFICATION EXERCISES
Falsification Outcome Readership Language
%Yes Air Traffic Fund True False True False
Reduced 2SLS Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced
Form 2nd Stage Form Form Form Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crime News Exposure (CNE) –1.757
(1.644)
Local Crime Propensity –0.193 –0.164 0.317 0.319 0.289 0.315
Differential (CPD) (0.128) (0.122) (0.213) (0.211) (0.207) (0.221)
Past Votes Outcome –0.249a –0.244a 1.003a 1.002a 1.007a 1.005a
(0.074) (0.073) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
HQ Crime Propensity Differential : –0.765
Deviation (∆HQC) (0.760)
Deviation of HQCj –0.401a 0.214 –0.860c 1.054
× Relative Distance (0.142) (0.136) (0.458) (1.273)
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
Adjusted R2 0.523 0.518 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850
First-stage F-statistic 10.79
Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at agglomeration level in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant
at 5%; a significant at 1%. Columns (1) and (2) show the 2SLS estimates of an estimation where the outcome is the vote share in favor of the Creation
of a special fund in favor of tasks in the air traffic domain that took place on the same day (Nov 29, 2009) as the Minaret Ban vote. Columns (3)
to (6) present the estimates of the readership and language reduced-form falsifications. In Column (3) we replicate the reduced-form estimation of
Table 2 focusing on the newspapers that are read in the municipality; in Column (4) we keep only newspapers not read in a municipality. In Column
(5) we only keep outlets edited in the language spoken in the municipality; in Column (4) we focus on newspapers that are written in a language not
spoken in the municipality. Since the instrument takes the value 0 once a newspaper is not read, we also instrument for market shares by weighting
each outlet by the relative distance between the (voting) municipality and the nearest headquarter municipality of that newspaper. Municipality
characteristics are included in all specifications: population size, share of German-speaking population, share of immigrants, net immigration,
sectoral employment, average income, squared average income, elevation, ruggedness, share of active population, share of young population (15-35
population), share of Protestants, share of Muslims, property crimes, and total market shares of the eleven newspapers included in this analysis.
Agglomeration fixed effects are included in all specifications.
41
Figure A.1: MINARET BAN AND PREVIOUS IMMIGRATION REFERENDA
0
50
100
M
in
ar
et
 B
an
0 25 50 75 100
Regulating Immigration (Sep 24, 2000)
0
50
100
0 25 50 75 100
Asylum Law (Nov 24, 2002)
0
50
100
M
in
ar
et
 B
an
0 25 50 75 100
Facilitated Naturalizations (Sep 26, 2004)
0
50
100
0 25 50 75 100
Democratic Naturalizations (Jun 01, 2008)
Observed Linear Fit
Note: Correlation between Minaret Ban referendum (Nov 29, 2009), and past immigration referenda. The unit of observation is a municipality. The
y axis is the fraction of vote share in favor of the Minaret Ban. The x axis is the vote share in favor of the corresponding immigration referendum.
Top-left: "For the regulation of immigration" (36.2% in favor); top-right: "Against abuses in the asylum law" (49.9% in favor); bottom-left:
"Facilitated naturalization of second-generation immigrants" (43.2% in favor); bottom-right: "For democratic naturalizations" (36.2% in favor).
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Figure A.2: NEWS AND VOTING: CRIME AND OBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS
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Note: Correlation between observable municipality characteristics and crime propensity differential in municipalities with at least 1 violent crime
in the 2009-2013 period. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at agglomeration level. OLS estimations. Left graph
presents the correlation between observable municipality characteristics and short-run crime propensity (HQCm); center graph the correlation with
long-run crime propensity (HQCm); the right graph the correlation with the deviation between short- and long-run crime propensity differential
(∆HQCm). All variables are constructed using data for the year of the aggression with the exception of language, religion, and skills level that are
constructed using data from 2000, and past voting outcomes that refer to the 2000-2008 period.
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Figure A.3: MUSLIM COMMUNITIES : EFFECT OF STEREOTYPES
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Note: Distribution of Muslim shares in Switzerland at nationality-level for six levels of stereotype. Stereotyped Muslim shares computed as
defined in Equation (19), i.e. applying the representativeness-based discounting approach developed by Bordalo et al. (2016). θ is a parameter that
captures the extent to which representativeness distorts beliefs. At the extreme, θ = 0 corresponds to the no-stereotyping case while θ = +∞ leads
to perceived shares equal to 0 or 1. Six distributions of Muslims shares are presented, based on alternative levels of stereotyping, ranging from
θ = 0 (top-left graph) to θ = 10 (bottom-right graph). The grey area represents the portion of the distribution below the median Muslim (0.027) of
the raw distribution (i.e. when θ = 0). Calculations based on religious affiliation by nationality (188 nationalities) in year 2000 at national-level.
Data come from the Swiss Statistical Office.
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Figure A.4: NEWS AND VOTING: ALTERNATIVE TIME FRAMES
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Note: The unit of observation is a municipality. The outcome is the Minaret Ban "yes" vote share. Standard errors clustered at agglomeration
level in parentheses. 2SLS estimations. Only second stage point estimates and confidence intervals for the CNE variable are reported. The crime
and news-related variables are calculated over different time windows before and after the vote: from one month up to eleven months before the
vote (sensitivity analysis), and from one month up to three months after the vote (placebo specifications). First stage F-statistics of the 11 to 2
months estimates reported range from 10.07 to 38.71. Second stage point estimate and confidence interval of the one month pre-vote period are
not reported since the first stage F-statistics is very low (0.31). Municipality characteristics are included in all specifications: population size, share
of German-speaking population, share of immigrants, net immigration, sectoral employment, average income, squared average income, elevation,
ruggedness, share of active population, share of young population (15-35 population), share of Protestants, share of Muslims, property crimes, and
total market shares of the eleven newspapers included in this analysis. Agglomeration fixed effects are included in all specifications.
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